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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
UINTAH FREIGHTWAYS, a
corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH and HAL S. BENNETT,
DONALD H.kCKING and JESSE
R. S. BUDGE, Commissioners of the
Public Service Comm~ssion of Utah,
and PACIFIC INTERMOUNTAIN
EXPRESS CO., and CLARK TANK
LINES COMPANY,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 9886

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an investigation by the Public Service Commission of Utah to determine why the rate published by
Uintah Freightways for the transportation of crude oil
in bulk between specific points within the Uintah Basin,
Utah, should not be permanently suspended.
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DISPOSITION BY PUBLIC SERVICE
OF UTAH

COMMI'8SIO~

This matter was heard by the Public Service Com
mission on the 18th day of December, 1962, and on the 5tl
day of March, 1963, said Commission issued its ordeJ
directing Uintah Freightways to cease transportation oJ
petroleum or petroleum products in bulk in tank vehicle~
and suspended and cancelled item No. 324-2 of Seconc
Revised Page 34-A of Tariff 5-G PSCU No. 5 filec
October 25, 1962.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Uintah Freightways, plaintiff and appellan~
hereafter referred to as appellant, seeks reversal of the
order of the Public Service Commission dated March 5,
1963, and asks that the Commission be directed to reinstate and make permanent the tariff heretofore filed and
above referred to.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 25, 1962, appellant caused to be published
a tariff naming a rate for the transportation of crude oil
in bulk between points in the Uintah Basin, Utah, which
tariff became effective on the 30th day of November,
1962. Thereafter the Public Service Commission of Utah,
hereafter referred to as Commission, issued its Investigation Docket No. 95 requiring appellant to appear and
shorw cause, if any there may be, why the tariff above
mentioned should not be permanently suspended and why
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3.
the Commission should not take such other and further
action as allowed by law.
The appellant, Uintah Freightways, holds authority
from the Commission to operate .as a common carrier of
property, handling both freight and express, in intrastate
commerce. Appellant's authority is in three parts and
reads as follows:
"ORD,ER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED, That Uintah Freightways, be, and
it is hereby issued Certificate· of Convenience
and Necessity No. 1288 authorizing it to operate
as a common carrier of property handling both
freight and express in intrastate commerce, as
follows:
A. 1. Between Salt Lake City, Utah and all points
within the Uintah Basin2 over U. S. Highway 91
from Salt Lake City to Provo, thence ove·r U. 8.
Highway 189 to Heher City and thence over
U. S. Highway No. 40 and various Utah State
and County Highways to all points within the
Uintah Basin with permission to use the Orem
Cut-off designated as Highway U-52 as alternate
route, serving, to, from and between all Uintah
Basin points.
2. Between Salt Lake City, Utah, and all points
within the Uintah Basin over U.S. Highway No.
40 and other various Utah State and County
Highways to all points within the Uintah Basin
serving to, from and between all Uintah Basin
points.
3. No local service between Salt L~ake City,
Utah, and Provo, Utah, including Provo, between
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Salt Lake City and Park City including Park
City or between Salt Lake City and Heber City
including Heber City is authorized except service is authorized between Salt Lake City and
Heber City including both termini on both
routes, on the one hand, and all points in the
Uintah Basin, on the other, and service is authorized to the intermediate and off route points of
Vivian Park, Wildwood, Charleston, Daniels,
Center Creek, Keetley, Midway and Hot Pots.
B.

Between Vernal, Utah, and Price, Utah, via Duchesne County, Utah serving Vernal, Utah and
Price, Utah and all intermediate points.

C.

Between all points in Utah authorized in A and B
above, on the one hand, and all points in Daggett
County, Utah, on the other, over irregular
routes, on call, except service to and from
Daggett County points is specifically restricted
against the movement of household goods as
usually defined, explosives, petroleum and petroleum products in bulk, and commodities which
be reason of their sizes, shape, weight, origin
or destination require special handling and
special equipment.

2. The Uintah Basin as used here is the area encompassed
in Duchesne and Uintah Counties and that portion of Wasatch
County in the natural drainage area of the Green River."

By its authority, Uintah Freightways, under parts A and
B, is authorized to transport all kinds of property between points therein designated which includes points in
Redwash Oil Field, Utah, and covered by the tariff in
question (R. 110, 153). Under Part C of its authority appellant is restricted in Daggett County against the move-
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5
ment of household goods, as usually defined, explosives,
petroleum and petroleum products in bulk and commodities which, by reason of their size, shape, weight, orgin
or destination, require special handling and special
equipment (R. 111).
In concluding that appellant has no authority under
its certificate to transport petroleum or petroleum products in bulk in tank vehicles, the Commission holds
that parts A and B of appellant's certificate, which contained no exceptions, and part e, which contains exceptions, grants identical operating rights (R. 200).
In summary, the undisputed evidence discloses that
appellant's authority dates back to October 1926 when it
was first issued to the Sterling Transportation Company
(R. 89). From time to time said authority has been enlarged and transferred and was ultimately purchased by
appellant from the Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. on September 22, 1958 (R. 111). When appellant was issued its
certificate of convenience and necessity on September 22,
1958, respondents, Pacific Intermountain Express Company and Clark Tank Lines Company, petroleum haulers,
did not appear in protest notwithstanding the fact that
the Commission by express direction included their
names as those entitled to notice of the hearing, which
presumably they received (R. 79-81, 106, 111).
Appellant's predecessors in interest, Sterling Tran..
sportation ,C'ompany and Uintah Freightlines, handled
the transportation of liquid petroleum products in bulk,
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6
as disclosed by their annual reports (Ex. 2). Since obtaining its authority, appellant has actively solicited any
and all traffic available and has discussed with Mr.
Kenneth H. Sowards, commissioned agent for the
Continental Oil Company, and with representatives of the
Standard Oil Company and other companies the transportation of petroleum and petroleum products in bulk
(R. 37-40, 41, 57-58). Upon receiving its first request for
the transportation of petroleum products in bulk, appellant made application to publish a rate in Intermountain
Tariff Bureau, Inc., Tariff No. ~G, said rate to be by
special publication and on one day notice. The special
pe rmission was denied and appellant then published the
rate on statutory notice (R. 56-57).
1

Appellant has actively protested any and all applications for certificates of convenience and necessity involving the area wherein it does business and to appellant's
knowledge there have not been any applications filed
since the year 1958 for certificates of convenience and
necessity to transport petroleum products in bulk (R. 57).
Respondents, Clarl{ and Pacific, have both appeared at
hearings in protest of the granting of applications for
the transportation of general commodities and at said
hearings have attempted to elicit from the general commodity carrier an exception to the transportation of
petroleum products in bulk (R~ 67-70).
There is no finding of uncertainty or ambiguity in
appellant's certificate, as disclosed by the Commission's
report and order (R. 196-200).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THERE IS NO AMBIGUITY IN APPELLANT'S CERTIFICATE OF CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY, AND
SAID CERTIFIC.A:TE IS NOT SUBJECT TO INTERPRETATION OR CLARIFICATION.

The purported finding of fact No. 2 of the Commission states in part as follows:
"The sole question for determination is the
interpretation to be given to said certificate No.
1288." (R. 196)
It is only where a certificate of convenience and
necessity is ambiguous or uncertain that it is subject to
interpretation or clarification by the Public Service Commission of Utah. Peterson v. Public Service Commission
of Utah et al. (1954), 1 Utah 2d 324, 266 P.2d 497. The
Peterson case involved a proceeding to review an order
of the Commission permanently suspending tariffs filed
by Wally Motor Lines, and referred to in the Court's
opinion as Peterson, for the transportation of commodities between Salt Lake City and Provo, Utah, via Heber
City. The right to render the service involved hinged
upon the language of the certificate. At the hearing no
question was raised that the rates proposed were excessive, discriminatory or in any way unfair or improper.
The hearing resolved itself around the interpretation of
the Peterson certificate. In ;reversing the Commission's
order permanently suspending the tariffs filed by
Peterson, the Supreme Court states :
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"Unless there is some uncertainty or ambigu
ity there is no basis for interpretation or clarifica.
tion of the certificate. If it were pennissible t<:
g.o back of the language and contradict its plarn
tenns, intolerable confusion and uncertainty
would exist with regard to operating rights."
The case of Salt Lake Transfer Company v. Barton
Truck Lines, Inc. (1959), 8 utah 2d 401, 335 P.2d 829, involved proceedings to review the construction that the
Public Service Commission had placed upon certificates
of convenience and necessity authorizing Salt Lake
Transfer Company to operate as a common motor carrier.
The correctness of the rule set forth in Peterson v. PUblic
Service Comm.ission, supra, was reiterated by the Supreme Court as follows:
"We do not gainsay the correctness of the
rule set forth in Peterson v. Public Service Commission, relied upon by plaintiffs ; that the extent
of the carrier's authority is to be found from the
terms of the certificate. We there said that it is
not permissible, 'to go baclr of the language and
contradict its plain tenns* * *.' "
In the case of W. S. Hatch Company v. Public Service Commission (1954), 3 Utah 2d 7, 277 P. 2d 809, involving a petition by Hatch for authority to haul acid
used in uranium mining, the Commission denied in part
Hatch's application and permitted a protest by another
carder upon the ground that its -authority includes the
right to transport acid in bulk in tank cars. The speeific
issue before the Supreme Court was whether or not the
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protestant Prichard's authority included the right to
haul acid. In the Hatch case the Court states:
"The interpretation of the Certificate presents a question of law only. The extent of
Prichard's authority must be as found within the
four corners of the Certificate and the rights
thereunder must be such a;s are fairly understood
from the import of its language. Unless there is
some uncertainty or ambiguity in the Certificate
there is no basis for interpretation or clarification. Operating rights may not be extended by
interpretation, and Prichard's authority could
not be augmented in this proceeding wherein he
appeared only as a protestant."
The Commission, in arriving at its order, relies upon
the case of Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Utah (19·62), 13 Utah 2d 72, 368 P.2d 590. In
this case Milne, in contemplation of transporting petroleum and petroleum products in bul:k in tank vehicles,
caused to be published a tariff. An investigation and
suspension hearing was ordered by the Commission to
determine Milne's authority to handle the transportation
of petroleum and petroleum products in bulk.
'Milne presented no evidence at the hearing and relied entirely upon the interpretation of its certificate.
The Milne case is distinguished from the instant matter
in the following particulars :
(a) Milne's authority is for the transportation of
"commodities generally," and in addition gives Milne
authority to handle the transportation of such items as
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explosives, airplane parts etc. Appellant's authority is
for the transportation of "property" with certain exceptions under part C of its authority.
(b) In the Milne case the Supreme Court noted that
Milne had always reported under the category of general
freight but never under liquid petroleum products. Appellant's predecessors in interest reported in its annual
report under both general freight and petroleum products (Ex. 2).
(c) In the Milne case evidence was offered by the
protesting carriers to show that Milne was never issued
authority for the transportation of petroleum products
in bulk, nor did Milne hold itself out to perform this
service. Milne presented no evidence to the contrary.
Appellant has actively solicited the transportation of
petroleum products in bulk, and immediately upon receiving its first request for the transportation of said
products made application to publish a rate and made
arrangements to procure the necessary equip1nent (Ex. 4,
R. 55-56). No evidence was offered to the contrary by
the Commission or protesting carriers Clark and Pacific.
(d) In the Milne case there was no evidence offered
that Milne or any other general commodity carrier had
ever protested the granting of authority to transport
petroleum products in bulk. The evidence discloses in the
instant matte~r that the authorities of Pacific and Clark
were both granted prior to the issuance to appellant of its
authority, and that appellant has actively protested any
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and all applications for certificates of convenience and
necessity within the area served by appellant. There is
no evidence to the contrary.
(e) In the Milne case no evidence was offered concering the prote·st of carriers specializing in the transportation of petroleum and petroleum products in bulk.
The evidence in the instant matter discloses that the Commission, by express direction, required notice to he sent to
respondents Pacific and Clark of the hearing resulting in
the granting to appellant of its authority, and discloses
that both Pacific and Clark have appeared in protest to
the granting of applications for the transportation of
general commodities and at said hearings have attempted
to elicit from the general commodities carriers an exception to the transportation of petroleum products in bulk.
The Commission erroneously interprets the decision
in the Milne case, supra, claiming that said case holds
that the word "property" in appellant's certificate does
not, under the facts and circumstances in the instance
matter, include all articles of commerce. This is not the
holding of the Milne case. In that case the term "commodities generally" was subject to interpretation and the
Supreme Court states :
"The meaning of the term 'commodities generally' must be ascertained from the particular
facts of eacn case."
In addition the Commission in its order quotes in finding
number 7 the language cited by appellant in its reply brief
and ta:ken from the Milne case as follows :
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''under Milne's all inclusive interpretation of
·commodities generally' the further designation of
commodities would be unnecessary."
and then interprets contrary to the law set forth above.
Appellant agrees with the Court's reasoning in the
Milne case, supra, that where certificates of convenience
and necessity authorize the transportation of commodities generally, and in addition authorize the transportation of such items as explosives, airplane parts,
supplies, equipment etc, that the further designation of
commodities would be unnecessary if the term "commodities generally' includes all property capable of transportation. By the same token, where a certificate of convenience and necessity authorizes the transportation of property without exception in certain areas, and then expressly excludes the transportation of certain commodities in other areas including liquid petroleum products
in bulk, the exclusion would be wholly unnecessary if the
word "property" did not include those items expressly
excluded. Part C of appellant's authority reads as
follows:
"Between all points in Utah authorized in A
and B above, on the one hand, and all points in
Daggett County, Utah, on the other, over irregular routes, on call, except service to and from
D'aggett County points is specifically restricted
against the movement of household goods as usually defined, explosives, petroleum and petroleum
products in bulk, and commodities which be reason
of their size, shape, weight, orgin or destination
require special handling and special equipment."
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It is apparent that appellant is only restricted against
the movement of petroleum and petroleum products in
bulk where said products orginate at or are destined to
Daggett County, Utah.

The case of Coastal Tank Lines, Inc. et al v. Charlton
Bros. Triansportation Company; Inc. (1948), 48 MCC 289,
is an action by a specialized petroleum products carrier
challenging the right of Charlton Bros. Transportation
Company, Inc. to handle the transportation of petroleum
products in bulk in tank vehicles under its general commodities authority.
The certificate of Charlton Bros. Transportation
Company, Inc. authorizes it to engage in transportation
in interstate and foreign commerce as a common carrier
by motor vehicle over regular and irregular routes between certain points or territories in Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia. The certificate contains three descriptions, e~ach relating t'O different points
or territories of the kinds of commodities Charlton may
transport. In part one the carrier is authorized to handle
the transportation of general commodities except livestock, dange1rous explosives, household goods, coal, sand
and lime. In part two the carrier is authorized to handle
the transportation of general commodities except explosives and commodities of unusual value and household
goods. In part three the carrier is authorized to handle
the transportation of general commodities except livestock, explosives, household goods and loose bulk goods
requiring special equipment. It was conceded .at the time
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of the hearing that the carrier could not handle the transportation of petroleum products in bulk, in tank vehicles
under part three of its authority. The question before
the Commission was whether in descriptions one ood two
the term "gener.al commodities" inclw.des petroleum
products in bulk, in tank trucks. The complainants and
integrators specialize in the transportation of petroleum
products and contended that the term "general commodities" does not include petroleum products in tanks and
that the transportation thereof by Charlton is being performed without authority. The Commission states:
"We believe the weight of authority supports
the conclusion that the term 'general' commodities' in certificates of public convenience and
necessity means all types of commodities, except
to the extent restricted. To hold, for example,
that two certificates, one containing authority to
transport general commodities without exceptions, and another, authority to transport general
commodities, except petroleum products, in bulk,
in tank trucks, grant identical operating rights,
is to do violence to the plain meaning of the teTIIlB
of the certificate. Interpretations of certificates
based on classifications of motor carriers, or on
the basis of matters antecendent to the issuance of
a certificate, the terms of which are not patently
ambiguous, can only lead to instability in the
motor carrier industry and uncertainty among
their patrons as to the operating rights of motor
carriers.
While it may be that when the certificate was
originally issued to the defendant, petroleum
products, in bulk, in tank trucks, should have
been excepted from the grant of authority, they

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
were not, and we may not now by interpretation,
so modify the certificate."
Appellant's certificate is clear, definite and· certain
and the attempt on the part of the Commission to inter:pret said certificate contrary to its terms is arbitrary,
capricious and is not supported by the evidence and is
contrary to the law.
POINT II
THE FINDINGS AND ORDER OF THE COMMISSION
ARE NOT ,SUPPORTED BY ANY COMPE'TENT EVIDENCE
AND THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION IS ARBITRARY
AND CAPRICIOUS.

Where the Commission acts in an arbitrary and
capricious manner its order is without authority and
must be set aside. Orders issued in the complete .absence
of factual support are clearly arbitrary, capricious and
void. Salt Lake Tr.ansfer Compamy v. Public Service
Commission of Ut,ah (1960), 11 Utah 2d 121, 355 P2d 706.
The Commission in its finding number 2 recognizes that
one of appellant's predecessors in interest, Sterling
Transportation Company, transported crude oil and gasoline in bulk and crude oil and gasoline from 1940 to
1946. It then concludes that having failed to transport
the products .after 1946 it should be deemed to have
abandoned any claim for such transportation if it ever
possessed an authority to do so. Such a finding is not
a statement of fact but a mere conclusion, wholly unsupported by the evidence and contrary to the law. By
Investigation Docket No. 95 appellant was not called
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upon to show cause why its authority to handle the
transportation of petroleum products in bulk should not
be treated as having been .abandoned and thus cancelled.
Abandonment as applied to property is the voluntary
relinquishment of the possession of a thing by the owner
with the intention of terminating his ownership. Ballent.ine Law Dictionary 1930; Sven J. Johanson et al., djbja
Johanson Oarbic Oilfield Trucking & Moving, Application No. 16645, Permit No. B-3566, Public Utilities Reports, Volume 3, Pur. 3d 1960, page 520.
The mere fact of an interruption in operations does
not automatically revoke .a certificate. Quaker City Bus
Line-Pur-Blackhawk Line, MC-F 1546, 38 MOC 603. A
continual holding out as willing to perform the service
is contrary and inconsistent with abandonment. Charlrton Bros. Tnansportation Co., Inc.-P11!l'-Rogers, MC-F1864, 39 MCC 610; Beef River Valley Telephone Co.,
2 U -989, Certificate of Convenience and Necessity 54,
Volume 16, Public Utilities Reports, New Series 1937,
page 361.
,The evidence is undisputed that appellant has continuously since obtaining its authority held itself out as
ready, able and willing to handle the transportation of
petroleum products in bulk in tank vehicles.
The statement of the Commission in finding number
2 that appellant never attempted to engage in any transportation of petroleum products in bulk in tank vehicles
prior to the filing of the subject Tariff is contrary to
the evidence. The undisputed evidence is that appellant
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has since receiving its authority actively solicited any
and all traffic available including the transportation of
petroleum and petroleum products in bulk in tank
vehicles. In addition appellant has made numerous inquiries concerning the. availability of equipment should
it be tendered traffic requiring the use of liquid bulk
equipment, and upon receiving its first request published
the tariff in question (R. 55-58, 37-40, 41). Business
prudence will not dictate a substantial investment in
equipment, said equipment to remain idle pending a
request for its use, and in the interest of the public a
carrier must operate economically. S.o long .as the carrier
has available to it the necessary equipment when the
need arises it is in a position to properly service its
certificate.
The Commission in finding number 6 states:
"The Commission must decide each case on
its own merits. It should not give a word or
phrase an enlarged meaning which it was never
intended to have; - a meaning· which the owner
of the certificate never intended it should have
and which in many respects its owner would not
now wish to claim." (Emphasis added)
There is a complete absence of factual support for the
above quoted language .and it is contrary to the plain
language of appellant's certificate and of appellant's
intentions and claims as evidenced by the record. In
fact, if appellant never intended or wished to claim its
certificate permitted the transportation of petroleum and
petroleum products in bulk in tank vehicles, this proceeding would not now be before the Court.
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The fact that appellant, without protest, pennitted
other petroleum carriers to secure certificates of convenience and necessity is immaterial. It is possible that
additional service may be required notwithstanding the
fact that there is in existence carriers presently authorized to render such service. In addition appellant's
authority was not granted until after the issuance to
Clark and Pacific to their certificates of convenience
and necessity.
The Commission in finding number 4 states :
"The word 'property', in common parlance,
has a very broad application, but what might be
the result if we should give to it the application
for which Freightways here contends Y If 'property', without exclusions includes petroleum in bulk,
in tank vehicles, then it includes everything transportable and Freightways can transport throughout all its territory other than to and from
Daggett County household goods, boilers, stressed
concrete girders, oil and gas rigs, tractors on flat
rack trucks, in fact, every conceivable article or
product known to commerce. Uintah Freightways,
of course, does not claim such a right at this
time, but its claim to transport such items would
be just as valid as to transport petroleum and
petroleum products in bulk in tank vehicles."
The word "property" as used in appellant's certificate
means "that which is palpable or tangible and is material
and physical in its nature." 42 Am. Jur., Property, Sec-tion 11, page 194. Petroleum and petroleum products in
bulk are capable of being touched or felt and are tangible,
material and physical in nature.
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Where the Commission interprets the English language contrary to the well-established definitions, thus
nullifying rights bargained and paid for by appellant,
the action on its part is arbitflary and carpicious. In
addition such action can only lead to instability in the
motor carrier industry and create uncertainty in the
minds of the shipping public concerning the products
carriers can handle. Through specialization we cannot,
by mere misuse of the English language, eliminate the
general commodity carrier anymore than we would seek
to eliminate the general physician or general practitioner.
To say that appellant does not claim the right to
handle the transportation of household goods, boilers,
stressed concrete girders, oil and gas rigs, tractors on
flat rack trucks and every other conceivable article or
product known to commerce through all its territory,
other than to and from Daggett County, is a conelusion
of the Commission unsupported by any evidence and is
clearly arbitrary and capricious. Appellant has since
first receiving its authority and does now hold itself out
as ready, able and willing to handle the transportation
of the items referred to above, and in fact engages in
such transportation.
In general the purported findings of the Commission are mere conclusions of either law or fact and are
without any factual support and are clearly arbitrary,
capricious and void.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20
POINT III.
THE PERMANENT SUSPENSION OF ITEM 324-2 OF
SE COND REVISED PAGE 34-8 OF TARIFF 5-G PSCU NO.
5 IS CONTRARY TO THE STATUTES OF THE STATE OF
UTAH, IS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
1

Under Section 54-6-4, Utah Code .Arvnotated 1953,
the Commission cannot arbitrarily refuse to approve a
tariff, thus nullifying appellant's right under its certificate of convenience and necessity. In this connection
we call the Court's attention to the case of Peterson v.
Public Service Commission of Ut.ah, supra, which states:
"It is the prerogative of this Court to determine whether the Commission regularly pursued
its authority. Under Sec. 54-6-4, U.C.A. 1953
vesting in the Commission power to regulate
motor carriers we do not find any authority
either directly, or reasonably incident thereto, by
which the Commission could arbitrarily refuse to
approve a tariff, and, thus nullify the rights a
carrier possesses under a Certificate of ·Convenience and Necessity."
POINT IV.
'THE COMMISSION ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S
O'F'FER OF PROOF CONCERNING AUTHORITIES OF CERTAIN CARRIERS.

Appellant offered in evidence the authorities of
Garrett Freight Lines, Inc., Lyman Truck Line, Linak
Trucking, Inc., Uintah Truck Express Company, L. R.
Reid & Sons Truck Line and Park City Truck Lines
(R. 52-53). The purpose of this offer was to prove that
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the Commission has heretofore issued authorities, general in their terms, with explicit exclusions as to certain
commodities including in some instances petroleum products in bulk.
As stated 1n Point I, where a certificate of convenience and necessity authorizes the transportation of
property without exception in certain areas and then
expressly excludes the transportation of certain commodities in other areas, the exclusion would be wholly
unnecessary if the word "property" did not include those
items expressly eoccluded. Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. Publice Service Commission of Utah, supra; Coastal Took
Lines, Inc. et al. v. Charlton Bros. Transportation Company, Inc., supra.
CONCLUSION
Appellant's authority authorizes it to transport
property without exception in part A and B and has
an express limitation in p:art C. If the term "property"
did not include the transportation of petroleum and
petroleum products in bulk in tank vehicles, the express
limitation in part C would be wholly unnecessary. Appellant's predecessors in interest handled the transportation of petroleum and petroleum products in bulk.
Appellant has since it acquired its authority considered
itself ready, able and willing to handle the transportation
of petroleum products in bulk and has continuously since
its inception solicited said business.
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The interpretation placed on appellant's authority
by the Commission is contrary to the plain, certain and
unambiguous terms of the certificate, has no factual
support and is clearly arbitrary, capricious and void.
We respectfully submit that appellant has authority to
transport petroleum and petroleum products in bulk in
the area covered by Item 324-2 of Second Revised Page
34-A of Tariff 5-G PSCU No. 5, and that the order of the
Conunission should be reversed and said Commission
should be ordered to reinstate and make permanent said
Tariff.
Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM S. RlCHARDS
GUS:TIN, RICHARDS &
MATTSSON
Attorneys for Appellant
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